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UNFAIR WARNING: BREACH NOTIFICATION IN
THE FCC'S ENHANCED TELEPHONE
RECORDS SAFEGUARDS
Stephen L. Markus*
In 2006, news of the ready availabilityof individuals' private telephone records through online investigation services highlighted the need
for privacy regulation to combat pretexting, a practice by which data
brokers sought and obtained confidential customer information by fraudulently posing as the target customer. Amid congressionalefforts aimed
at protecting consumer privacy, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)implemented heightened restrictionson the disclosure of call
records through new regulationsfor telecommunications carriers. In requiring customer notice of unauthorized phone record disclosures, the
new FCC regulations attempt to balance the ultimate goal of consumer
protection against the investigative needs of law enforcement entities by
prioritizing notice to enforcement agencies upon discovery of a security
breach while delaying notice to affected consumers. This Note argues
that these delay provisions threaten consumer welfare by needlessly
leaving consumers unable to protect themselves against the dangers
stemming from such leaks. In lieu of the current FCC breach notification provisions, this Note proposes improving the effectiveness of phonerecord breach notification by modeling new regulations or legislation
after existing state laws and proposedfederal laws for protection of sensitive personal information implicating identity theft.
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INTRODUCTION

The public availability of an average citizen's telephone call
records, Justice Potter Stewart once noted, "easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life." 1 The privacy threats of unauthorized
phone record disclosure presaged by Justice Stewart gained public attention in the wake of the so-called pretexting scandals reported in 2006.2
Pretexting occurs when a third party poses as a customer in order to
obtain that customer's confidential information, thereby circumventing
the carrier's system for protecting billing records. The ease with which a
private individual's phone records could be purchased through internet
investigation services sent shockwaves through Congress and the telecommunications industry, 3 prompting policymakers to counteract this
4
practice through new legislation and agency regulation.
Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Section 222) provides statutory authority for regulating the release of telecommunications
carriers' customer call records and other personal information, collectively known as "customer proprietary network information" (CPNI). 5
On June 8, 2007, in response to a petition filed by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), 6 the Federal Communications Commission
1 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

2 See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Jenny Anderson, A Company, a Fund and a Feud, N.Y.
TimEs, Nov. 8, 2006, at C I.
3 See Combating Pretexting: Hearing on H.R. 936, Prevention of FraudulentAccess to
Phone Records Act, Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 70 (2007)
[hereinafter H.R. 936 Hearing] (Prepared Statement of Hon. Steve Largent, President and
C.E.O., CTIA-The Wireless Association) ("Incidents like the unauthorized release of General Wesley Clark's call records and the Hewlett-Packard pretexting scandal served as a wakeup call for all of us.").
4 See Matt Richtel, With a Little Stealth, Just About Anyone Can Get Phone Records,
N.Y. Tmms, Sept. 7, 2006, at C9.
5 47 U.S.C. § 222(c) (2000); see also Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of
1996: Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and
Other Customer Information, 21 F.C.C.R. 1782, 1784 (proposed Feb. 14, 2006) (notice of
proposed rulemaking) ("Practically speaking, CPNI includes information such as the phone
numbers called by a consumer; the frequency, duration, and timing of such calls; and any
services purchased by the consumer, such as call waiting. CPNI therefore includes highlysensitive personal information.").
6 Petition of the Electronic Privacy Information Center for Rulemaking to Enhance Security and Authentication Standards for Access to Customer Proprietary Network Information,
CC Docket No. 96-115 (filed Aug. 30, 2005) [hereinafter EPIC Petition].
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(FCC) promulgated a new set of regulations accompanying Section 222
in an attempt to bolster the protection of CPNI and broaden the categories of carriers to which the protection applies. 7 The breach notification
provisions, inter alia, require that carriers refrain from disclosing a security breach to consumers for at least seven business days after first reporting it to law enforcement officials. 8 This mandate gives law enforcement
officials the opportunity to respond to news of a breach before affected
consumers are notified. 9 If the breach appears to have an imminent detrimental impact on affected consumers, the new rule grants carriers some
discretion in making an exception to the standard procedures. 10 However, law enforcement agencies retain the right to delay notification to
consumers for as long as they deem reasonably necessary1 1-a provision
12
that drew objections from two FCC commissioners.
This Note examines the potential impact of the FCC's CPNI breach
notification provisions on consumer privacy and welfare. Part I provides
background on the laws and policies leading up to the current CPNI rule.
Part II analyzes in detail the provisions of the CPNI rule and describes
the problematic implications of the FCC's prioritization of notice to law
enforcement agencies over notice to consumers in the event of unauthorized disclosure of CPNI. Part III posits that the breach notification procedures contained in existing state (and proposed federal) electronic
database protection laws provide superior protection of consumer interests and would form a more effective framework for use in the CPNI
context than the procedures in the current FCC rule. The final section
concludes.
I.

LEGAL AND POLICY BASES FOR TELEPHONE

RECORDS PRIVACY

A.

LAWS

History of Federal CPNI Protection

Based upon findings that a citizen's privacy rights are constitutionally protected and are jeopardized by the use of information technology
7 See Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,948 (June 8, 2007)
(codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64). The final CPNI rule went into effect on December 8, 2007. See
Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,808 (Dec. 13, 2007).
8 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2011(b)(1) (2008).
9 See id. § 64.2011(a).
10 See id. § 64.2011(b)(2).
11 See id. § 64.2011 (b)(3).
12 See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications
Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information,
22 F.C.C.R. 6927, 7020 (Apr. 2, 2007) (further notice of proposed rulemaking) (Statement of
Commissioner Michael J. Copps); id. at 7022 (Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S.
Adelstein).
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to collect, store, and disseminate personal data, 13 the Privacy Act of 1974
established regulations governing federal agencies' collection and use of
personal information about individual citizens. 14 Although it specifically
applies to government entities, the Privacy Act has provided the foundation for many other types of privacy legislation.' 5 Congress and federal
agencies have since enacted a patchwork system of regulations designed
to address the privacy threats posed by specific types of industries and
16
business practices.
Restrictions on the disclosure of CPNI in telephone records first appeared in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act), 17 which
relies upon carriers to protect their customers' personal information
through self-regulation. Section 222 of the 1996 Act designated CPNI as
a protected category of information and stated that carriers have a duty to
safeguard its confidentiality.' 8 In the statute, Congress balanced the
goals of granting consumers access to their own CPNI with preventing
unauthorized disclosure of such information to third parties. 1 9 Under the
accompanying regulations, which are still in effect, a carrier is prohibited
from disclosing CPNI to a third party unless it has received the customer's affirmative consent to do S0.20 Expressly delineated requirements for carriers to use in safeguarding CPNI include implementing
21
CPNI-specific training and disciplinary procedures for personnel,
maintaining records detailing access to CPNI records, 22 and certifying
compliance with the FCC's CPNI requirements. 23 To date, the FCC has
brought several enforcement actions against carriers who allegedly failed
24
to meet these requirements.
13 See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, §2A, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)).
14 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
15 See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy
(What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 42.

16 See, e.g., Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000);
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000); Electronic Communication
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000); Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2000).
17 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)).
18 See 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2000).
19 See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications
Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information,
21 F.C.C.R. 1782, 1784 (proposed Feb. 14, 2006) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
20 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005(b) (2008).
21 See id. § 64.2009(b).
22 See id. § 64.2009(c).
23 See id. § 64.2009(e).
24 See, e.g., CBeyond Comm'ns, Inc., 22 F.C.C.R. 18,098 (2007) (forfeiture order);
AT&T Inc., 22 F.C.C.R. 16,285 (2007) (order on compliance with the commission's rules and
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The 1996 Act's means of protecting CPNI, however, proved unsatisfactory in restricting the availability of consumer phone records
through online services. 25 Despite detailed regulations and compliance
from carriers, third parties were able to gain unauthorized access to CPNI
through pretexting, hacking into customers' online accounts, and possibly through the aid of "dishonest insiders" within the carriers' own
ranks. 26 In an effort to curb this access, carriers filed suits against companies offering consumer CPNI for sale, seeking to enjoin such activities. 27 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 made the unauthorized
acquisition of consumer financial information a federal crime, but it did
not include CPNI because telephone records are not of a financial nature. 28 The Federal Trade Commission (FFC), utilizing its authority to
prevent "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,"
investigated and brought enforcement actions against several purveyors
of protected consumer CPNI.29 State attorneys general also filed suits
against alleged pretexters on the basis of state laws. 30 These, however,
were indirect means of ensuring the confidentiality of CPNI and did not
address the gaps in the underlying system of laws and regulations that
enabled such disclosures to occur.
In February 2006, the FCC accepted EPIC's petition for tighter
rules on carriers' disclosure of phone records and initiated a rulemaking
31
proceeding, seeking comment on more effective CPNI safeguards.
Calling the data brokers' conduct in fraudulently obtaining phone records
"disturbing," the FCC asked for detailed information about carriers'
CPNI maintenance, security, and disclosure procedures. 32 In April 2007,
the FCC adopted new regulations designed to strengthen existing protection of CPNI by restricting the release of "call detail information" (a

regulations governing customer proprietary network information); Connect Paging, Inc., 22
F.C.C.R. 15,146 (2007) (forfeiture order).
25 See EPIC Petition, supra note 6, at 1, Appendix C (listing forty web sites offering to
obtain and sell CPNI); see also Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg.
31,948, 31,949 (June 8, 2007) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
26 See EPIC Petition, supra note 6, at 1.
27 See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications
Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information,
22 F.C.C.R. 6927, 6934-35 (Apr. 2, 2007) (further notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter
CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007)].
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 6821 (2000).

29 Id. § 45(a)(2); see H.R. 936 Hearing, supra note 3, at 32 (Statement of Lydia Pames,
Federal Trade Commission).
30 See CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 6935.
31 See Customer Proprietary Network Information, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,317, 13,318 (Mar.
15, 2006) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
32

Id.
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subset of CPNI), 33 notifying customers of account changes,3 4 specifying
requirements for notifying law enforcement officials and customers of
unauthorized disclosure of CPNI, 35 and establishing a "general requirement to take reasonable measures to discover and protect against activity
that is indicative of pretexting."' 36 These provisions form the primary
37
subject of this Note and will be discussed in detail below.
While the FCC was engaged in the rulemaking process, widely publicized accounts of pretexting prompted Congress to implement protective measures as well. In January 2006, reports surfaced detailing how a
blogger was able to successfully purchase General Wesley Clark's cell
phone records through an online data broker.3 8 In September 2006, the
news broke that private investigators, hired by Hewlett-Packard to identify the source of a leak, obtained the phone records of both the corporation's board members and journalists in the course of their
investigation. 39 In the wake of the resulting public outcry over the availability of consumer phone records, Congress eliminated the gap in federal law regarding pretexting by criminalizing fraudulent methods of
obtaining confidential phone records. 40 The passage of the Telephone
Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006 gave law enforcement agencies stronger tools for curtailing the practices of pretexters and other data
brokers offering phone records for purchase, but some members of Con41
gress thought that additional statutory safeguards were necessary.
33 Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,948, 31,961 (June 8,
2007) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64) ("Call detail information ... [is][a]ny information that
pertains to the transmission of specific telephone calls, including, for outbound calls, the number called, and the time, location, or duration of any call and, for inbound calls, the number
from which the call was placed, and the time, location, or duration of any call."); see also
CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 6936 (prohibiting carriers from releasing call
detail information based on customer-initiated telephone contact unless the customer provides
the carrier with a pre-established password, unless the customer requests call detail information to the customer's address of record, and unless a carrier chooses to disclose non-call-detail
CPNI to a customer after the carrier authenticates the customer).
34 See Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 31,949 (finding that
"this notification requirement will also empower customers to provide carriers with timely
information about pretexting activity, which the carriers may not be able to identify easily");
see also CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 6942 (requiring carriers to notify customers immediately of certain account changes).
35 See CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 6943.
36 Id. at 6946.
37 See infra Part Il.A.
38 See Frank Main, Blogger Buys PresidentialCandidate'sCall List: 'Nobody's Records
Are Untouchable,' as $90 Purchase Online Shows, Cm.SuN-TLMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A1O.
39 See Richtel, supra note 4, at C9.
40 See Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1039 (West 2007).
41 See infra Part I.B. for a description of proposed federal legislation to regulate unauthorized access to CPNI.
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Proposed Federal CPNI Legislation

The proposed Prevention of Fraudulent Access to Phone Records
Act of 2007 (H.R. 936) contains additional measures designed to bolster
CPNI protection. 42 The bill would prohibit the third-party solicitation of
another person or business to obtain an individual's CPNI if the soliciting third party should know that the records would be sought under false
pretenses.4 3 A violator of this provision would be subject to an enforcement action by the FTC. 44 H.R. 936 would require the FCC to enforce
amendments to Section 222 further restricting third-party CPNI access to
certain situations, some of which mirror those contained in the FCC's
subsequently adopted 2007 CPNI rule.4 5 However, H.R. 936 goes beyond the scope of the FCC's CPNI rule by requiring more direct FCC
involvement in the ongoing enforcement process. A carrier that discovers a breach would be required by H.R. 936 to notify affected customers
and report the breach to the FCC, rather than to law enforcement officials. 4 6 Additionally, the FCC would be tasked with conducting "periodic audits" to ensure compliance with CPNI confidentiality
regulations. 47 Although these procedures would impose greater maintenance and enforcement requirements upon the FCC, they might also ensure more effective oversight and accountability by giving federal
regulators, rather than carriers, the discretion to determine the timing of
notification to consumers.
Similarly, the Protecting Consumer Phone Records Act (S. 780)
proposes amending Section 222 to tighten restrictions on the disclosure
of CPNI and to specify procedures for notifying consumers of system
breaches. 48 Like H.R. 936, S. 780 bars not only unauthorized acquisition
of another's phone records, but also solicitation of phone records from a
party whom one knows will use unlawful means to obtain them. 49 In the
event of a disclosure to a third party in violation of S. 780, providers
would be required to notify affected consumers within fourteen days of
discovery of such a breach, subject to delays if law enforcement or national security agencies deem them necessary.5 0 Significantly, in addition to delegating enforcement duties to the FCC, the FTC, and to the
states, S. 780 explicitly grants a private right of action to both providers
42 See Prevention of Fraudulent Access to Phone Records Act, H.R. 936, 110th Cong.
(2007).
43 See id. § 101(b).

44 See id. § 103.
45 See id. § 203.
46 See id. § 203(h)(1)(A).
47 Id.
48 See Protecting Consumer Phone Records Act, S. 780, 1 10th Cong. (2007).
49 See id. § 2(a).
50 See id. § 509(d).
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and consumers who fall victim to unauthorized access of CPNI. 5 l The
advantages of this model lie in its multiple avenues of enforcement and
in its straightforward procedures for consumer notification, except in
cases where law enforcement agencies find delay necessary. Problems
may arise, however, because S.780 allows providers, of their own accord, to delay notification of consumers for fourteen days after discovery
of the breach, when discovery itself may not occur until the disclosure
52
has already begun to pose real risks for consumers.
II.

A.

THE

FCC's

STRENGTHENED

CPNI RULE

PrioritizedBreach Notification to Law Enforcement

The FCC's newly effective CPNI rule of 2007 provides that in the
event of an unauthorized disclosure of protected CPNI-for instance, if a
carrier discovers that call records have been improperly disclosed-a
carrier must notify the United States Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation "[a]s soon as practicable," and no later than seven
business days after "reasonable determination" of the breach. 53 A carrier
may not notify affected consumers or the general public until it has completed its notice to law enforcement in accordance with the rule's procedures. 54 Generally, a carrier must wait seven business days after its
notice to law enforcement before it notifies consumers. 55 However, if
the carrier perceives "an extraordinarily urgent need" to notify affected
consumers earlier than the customary seven-day waiting period "in order
to avoid immediate and irreparable harm," the rule requires the carrier to
indicate this need to the law enforcement agencies and to first consult
with the relevant agency before initiating consumer notification. 56 Another exception to the standard notification timeline allows an investigating agency to further delay notice to consumers or the public for an
initial period of up to thirty days-subject to extension "as reasonably
necessary in the judgment of the agency"-if it determines that notice
per the ordinary procedures "would impede or compromise an ongoing
or potential criminal investigation or national security. ' 57 The rule also
gives carriers considerable latitude in customizing the method of consumer breach notification to accord with their own judgments in light of
58
specific circumstances.
51 See id. § 2(c)-(d).

52 See id. § 4(d)(2).
53 47 C.F.R. § 64.2011 (b) (2008).
54 See id. § 64.2011 (a).
55 See id. § 64.2011(b)(1).
56 Id. § 64.2011(b)(2).
57 Id. § 64.2011 (b)(3).
58 See Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,948, 31,950 (June 8,
2007) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
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The FCC frames its objective in adopting the new CPNI regulations
as promoting consumer protection. 59 However, in practice, provisions
requiring immediate notice to law enforcement agencies-alongside
delayed notification to consumers-reserve for law enforcement officials
and carriers the discretion to determine when and how to notify affected
consumers. Meanwhile, the consumers at risk of adverse action remain
unaware of the breach. The result is that affected consumers cannot immediately take individualized steps to mitigate the risks posed by such
disclosures of their sensitive information. The FCC claims that its rule
balances "a customer's need to know with law enforcement's ability to
undertake an investigation of suspected criminal activity, which itself
might advance the goal of consumer protection."'60 It advances two reasons in support of this compromise: (1) immediate public knowledge of a
breach may hinder the investigation efforts of law enforcement officials,
and (2) the delay is reasonable when considered in conjunction with the
rule's exception enabling immediate notice if the carrier anticipates a risk
6
of "immediate and irreparable harm." '
The FCC's stated reasons for delayed notice to consumers, while
sensible on their face, fail to justify a rule that defers to the judgment of
carriers in determining the nature and timing of consumer notification.
First, the concern for effective law enforcement and national security
does not justify a system of delayed notification absent extraordinary circumstances. In effect, this rule presumes that threats requiring secrecy
are the norm, instead of the exception. This presumption departs from
immediate notice provisions in other data protection laws designed to
combat invasive practices whose methods and threats largely mirror
those of telephone record pretexting. 62 Dissenting with respect to this
provision in the final CPNI rule, FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps
called this delayed notice requirement "needlessly overbroad. '63 The interest in ensuring law enforcement efficacy could be just as effectively
protected by allowing immediate notice to consumers as soon as law enforcement agencies receive news of a breach, unless the investigating
agency decides to affirmatively invoke an exception providing for de59 See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications
Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information,
22 F.C.C.R. 6927, 6933 (Apr. 2, 2007) (further notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter
CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007)] ("The carriers' record on protecting CPNI demonstrates that the
Commission must take additional steps to protect customers from carriers that have failed to
adequately protect CPNI.").
60 Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 31,950.
61 See CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 6944.
62 See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
63 CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 7020 ("[The rule] falls to distinguish
those exigent circumstances in which delayed notification is necessary from what I believe to
be the majority of cases in which immediate notification to a victim is appropriate.").
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lay.64 Additionally, Commissioner Copps perceptively noted that con-

trary to the Commission's stated assumptions, immediate notification to
affected consumers may actually improve the success of an investigation

by enabling consumers to work together with law enforcement in identifying the perpetrators of the breach or third parties utilizing the leaked
CPNI.

65

Second, the grant of discretion to carriers to expedite consumer notification under compelling circumstances does little to ensure reliable
protection of CPNI. An initial problem is that carriers, despite their possible expertise regarding the best means of protecting CPNI stored in
their customer databases, are not experts on the practical implications of
a CPNI breach for customer privacy. 66 Therefore, it makes little sense to
entrust carriers with the fundamental decision of whether expedited notice to consumers is necessary in a particular instance. Even though market considerations will presumably encourage carriers to act in their
customers' best interest, carriers may instead succumb to the countervailing desire to minimize controversy by ignoring, delaying acknowledgment of, or downplaying the significance of a newly discovered
breach. 6 7 At the very least, the FCC, with its broad expertise in this area
and its greater levels of accountability, could more effectively assume
this responsibility. For a more sensible method of responding to a suspected breach, the FCC might look to its own new regulation on notification of account changes, a provision which requires immediate
notification to consumers in the event of a change to existing account
information or the creation of new account information. 6 8
64 See Comments of Consumer Action, et al., In re Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Customer Proprietary Network Information, 21 (July 9, 2007) (No. CC 96-115) ("[AIll
customers must be notified as soon as possible in the event of a security breach. However,
occasional exigent circumstances might arise where immediate notification could compromise
national security. In the rare event of such a circumstance, a delay in notification may be
sanctioned. This delay must be limited to no more than seven (7) days, and should require
formal notification to the agency head. In addition, such circumstances must truly be exigent,
and the harm of disclosure 'immediate and irreparable,' as customers have a right to protect
their own data and act upon notification of a breach.").
65 See CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 7020 ("I continue to believe that
notification to the victim ... will often actually aid law enforcement because the violator is
frequently someone well known to the victim. If an unauthorized individual has gained access
to personal telephone records involving victims of stalking or spousal violence, it won't be the
carrier or the law enforcement agency-but the victims-who are in the best position to know
when and how harm may be heading toward them.").
66 See id.
67 Paul M. Schwartz and Edward J. Janger term this phenomenon the "disclosure disincentive." Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105
MicH. L. REV. 913, 928 (2007) ("Disclosure may increase the risk of liability, because it
makes traceable an otherwise untraceable security breach. Furthermore, disclosure also brings
publicity to an event and might thereby prompt costly legal action or regulatory scrutiny.").
68 See Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,948, 31,949 (June 8,
2007) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64) ("[T]he Commission finds that this notification require-
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Third, under the new CPNI regulations, the ability of carriers to
protect the privacy of their consumers by circumventing the customary
waiting period is still subject to de facto approval by federal law enforcement agencies. The CPNI rule might permit an investigating agency to
indefinitely withhold consumer notification on the unsupported grounds
that extension of the initial waiting period is "reasonably necessary in the
judgment of the agency." 69 The prudence that agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency have
demonstrated in the handling of private consumer information has recently been called into question by the controversies surrounding federal
law enforcement's warrantless surveillance program, a process that in
part involved CPNI. 70 Law enforcement agencies often insulate themselves from accountability by justifying any action taken as necessary to
national security. Thus, enabling law enforcement officials to indefinitely delay notification to consumers of a breach that may pose an imminent and detrimental threat to their welfare 7' potentially opens the
door to abuses in discretion for which law enforcement privileges ob72
struct judicial oversight.
Under the new regulatory system, the very nature of the FCC's own
enforcement measures may further undermine proper notification of consumers whose CPNI has been compromised. The CPNI rule places the
onus on carriers to discover and report CPNI leaks to law enforcement
and affected consumers, based on the 1996 Act's statutory mandate that
"[e]very telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information. '73 However, upon learning of a CPNI
ment will also empower customers to provide carriers with timely information about pretexting
activity, which the carriers may not be able to identify easily.").
69 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 l(b)(3) (2008); see also CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R.
at 7022-23 (Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein) ("I find no statutory basis in
the Act for granting the FBI a blank check to delay notice to customers. I can understand the
need for delay in extraordinary circumstances identified by law enforcement, but automatic
delays coupled with unlimited and unchecked extensions are not appropriate.").
70 See CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 7021; see also Frederick M. Joyce &
Andrew E. Bigart, Liabilityfor All, Privacyfor None: The Conundrum of Protecting Privacy
Rights in a Pervasively Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1481, 1493 (2007).
71 Congress has recognized that "the unauthorized disclosure of telephone records not
only assaults individual privacy but, in some instances, may further acts of domestic violence
or stalking, [and] compromise the personal safety of ... victims of crime ...." Telephone
Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-476, § 2, 120 Stat. 3568, 3568
(2007) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1039). See also Prevention of Fraudulent Access to Phone
Records Act, H.R. 936, 110th Cong. § 201(4) (2007) ("Disclosure of personal records can also
lead to harassment, intimidation, physical harm, and identity theft.").
72 See, e.g., Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding
customers' discovery request that a carrier disclose whether or not it had provided large quantifies of detailed consumer call records to the National Security Administration to be barred by
the state secrets privilege based on national security concerns).
73 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2000); see CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 6943.
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breach caused by a carrier's disclosure, the FCC may assume that the
carrier's CPNI safeguards are systemically inadequate 74 and may proceed to punish the carrier. 75 Rewarding such self-policing diligence with
a presumption of faulty procedures and the threat of enforcement sanctions threatens to deter adherence to the procedural foundation upon
which the CPNI protection model relies. 76 Carriers who properly identify and report weaknesses in their CPNI safeguarding systems risk exposing themselves to further regulatory intervention, while those who do
not may escape liability for their errors. 77 Such a reporting disincentive
may in fact delay notification of a breach to affected consumers or even
prevent it altogether. In all, the prescribed means of enforcing the new
CPNI provisions detract from the ultimate goal of protecting the privacy
of consumer phone records.
B.

Risks of Delayed Notice to Consumers

Requiring carriers to notify consumers of a suspected breach is necessary to ensure that affected consumers take appropriate protective measures upon learning that their private calling information has been
compromised. 78 The FCC asserts that its new regulations are consistent
with this interest. 79 However, as discussed above, the breach notification
provisions contained in the CPNI regulations have the potential to undermine the FCC's own stated objective by delaying notification to victims
of pretexting in order to protect law enforcement and national security
objectives. 80 Delayed notice to consumers is dangerous because the moment of the initial breach is when notice to consumers is most crucial in
74 See Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. at 31,950 ("[T]he Commission hereby puts carriers on notice that the Commission henceforth will infer from evidence that a pretexter has obtained unauthorized access to a customer's CPNI that the carrier
did not sufficiently protect that customer's CPNI.").
75 See id. at 31,951.
76 See Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative Association, et al., In
re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers'
Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information, 3 (Aug. 7, 2007) (No. CC 96-115) ("There
is no reason to infer that a carrier has not satisfied its legal obligation to take 'reasonable

measures' to protect CPNI simply because a pretexter is successful in its efforts.").
77 See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 67, at 928.
78 Without the benefit of such a requirement, consumers in the past have typically failed
to learn of breaches for a substantial period of time. See, e.g., Internet Data Brokers: Who Has
Access to Your Private Records?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 19 (2006) (statement of Adam
Yuzuk of Atlantic Beach, New York).
79 See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications
Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information,
22 F.C.C.R. 6927, 6944 (Apr. 2, 2007) (further notice of proposed rulemaking) ("This notice

will also empower carriers and consumers to take whatever 'next steps' are appropriate in light
of the customer's particular situation.").
80 See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
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order to prevent harm from the unauthorized disclosure of their telephone
records. 8 1 Victims of CPNI breaches who, because of delayed notice or
otherwise, lack the ability to take affirmative protective measures, face
potentially serious threats to their privacy and safety. 82 Consumers with
compromised CPNI face a heightened risk of harassment and violence to
their person. Documented intrusions on privacy from past breaches have
included incidents of stalking and physical threats. 83 One data broker's
sale of the home phone numbers and addresses of Los Angeles Police
Department detectives to suspected mobsters resulted in the intimidation
of the detectives and their families. 84 In another case, a woman was
murdered by a stalker who had purchased her social security number,
date of birth, and employment address from a private investigator who
85
obtained the information by posing as an insurance company official.
Although dismissed by some as improbable, 86 withheld or delayed
notice to consumers increases the potential for identity theft, given the
similarity of methods by which pretexters obtain CPNI and the personal
information used to steal a person's identity. 87 Additionally, once an
unauthorized party obtains telephone records, the subject of the records
is at increased risk of other intrusions on personal and financial privacy. 8 8 Congress has recognized the severity of the risk to individuals
posed by the misuse of such data. 89

81 See CPNI NPRM (Apr. 2, 2007), 22 F.C.C.R. at 7023 (Statement of Commissioner
Jonathan S. Adelstein).
82 See supra note 71.
83 See, e.g., Phone Recordsfor Sale: Why Aren't Phone Records Safe from Pretexting?:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, 109th
Cong. 46 (2006) [hereinafter Phone Recordsfor Sale] (Prepared Statement of Hon. Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission) ("Although the acquisition of telephone
records does not present the opportunity for immediate financial harm as the acquisition of
financial records does, it nonetheless is a serious intrusion into consumers' privacy and could
result in stalking, harassment, and embarrassment.").
84

Id.

85 Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005-06 (N.H. 2003).
86 See Phone Records for Sale, supra note 83, at 46.
87 Protecting Consumers' Phone Records: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs, Product Safety, and Insurance of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 35 (2006) (Prepared Statement of Robert Douglas, Chief Executive Officer, PrivacyToday.com).
88 See Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-476, § 2,
120 Stat. 3568, 3568 (2007) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1039).
89 See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong. § 2(8)
(2007) (finding that "data misuse and use of inaccurate data have the potential to cause serious
or irreparable harm to an individual's livelihood, privacy, and liberty and undermine efficient
and effective government operations").
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DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS: SUPERIOR PROTECTION
OF CONSUMER PRIVACY

A.

State Provisions

In developing more effective regulation of CPNI breach notification
procedures, the FCC should look to state laws responding to breaches of
sensitive personal data. Sparked in large part by news of database security breaches 90 that compromised large quantities of consumers' "personal
information" 91 and made consumers vulnerable to identity theft, the majority of states enacted laws requiring private entities whose databases
are involved in a security breach to notify affected individuals. 92 The
basic purpose of such provisions is to reduce the risk of identity theft or

fraud by enabling consumers to monitor their credit histories. 93 The first

state to pass such a law was California in 2003, and its statute serves as
the model on which other states have based their respective data breach
notification laws. 94 Notably, California's notification requirements induced the information broker ChoicePoint to notify at least 166,000 affected consumers of one of the first major breaches of personal

information.

95

90 For a comprehensive list of reported database breaches, see Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.
htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2008).
91 Most states with data breach notification laws follow California's lead in defining the
"personal information" covered by their respective statutes as an "individual's first name or
first initial and last name in combination with any one of the following data elements, when
either the name or the data elements are not encrypted": (1) social security number; (2)
driver's license number or state ID card number; and (3) account number or credit card number in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.82(e) (West 2007);
see also, e.g., ARIz. Rav. STAT. § 44-7501(L)(6) (West 2008). However, under the California
definition, "personal information" subject to notification requirements does not include publicly available information that is lawfully available to the general public from federal, state, or
local government records. See id. § 1798.82(f).
92 As of December 16, 2008, 44 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands had enacted laws requiring consumer notification in the event of a breach of
personal information. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach
Notification Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Dec.
29, 2008). For an overview of each state's provisions, see Consumers Union, States with
Notice of Security Breach Laws, at http://www.consumersunion.org/campaigns//financialprivacynow/002215indiv.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2008).
93 See Federal Trade Commission, Dealing with a Data Breach, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
edu/microsites/idtheft/business/data-breach.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2008).
94 See Daniel J. Solove et al.,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 673, 699 (2d ed. 2006); see
also CAL. CrV. CooE § 1798.81.5-.84.
95 See Jon Swartz & Byron Acohido, Who's Guarding Your Data in the Cybervault?:
ChoicePointRedeemed Itself but Not All Brokers as Careful, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2007, at
lB. Although ChoicePoint discovered the breach in October of 2004, it delayed notification to
the over 30,000 California victims until February of 2005 in order to minimize interference
with the law enforcement investigation. See Solove et al., supra note 94, at 699. In response
to the ensuing outcry from other states and members of the public, ChoicePoint voluntarily
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Under these laws, an entity discovering a breach must notify consumers and law enforcement officials according to the procedures of
each state in which an affected individual resides. The state laws are
divided on whether a notification-triggering breach occurs merely as the
result of an "unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information" 96 or whether there must also exist a "reasonable likelihood of harm
to customers" before notification is required. 97 Enforcement methods
98
and penalties for noncompliance also vary widely from state to state.
In most other significant aspects, however, the state laws have common
provisions that would more effectively protect consumer privacy in the
telephone record context than the notification procedures in the FCC's
CPNI rule.
The time frame for data breach notification required by most state
provisions better incorporates the urgency necessary to minimize adverse
effects of unauthorized CPNI disclosure than the current FCC rule does.
Most state provisions require disclosure of the breach to each affected
individual as expediently as possible and without unreasonable delay, 99
but some states make allowances for special circumstances, such as the
needs of law enforcement," ° or any other measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the integrity and security of the
data system. 10 1 A few states mirror the FCC's CPNI rule in requiring
notice to law enforcement prior to individual consumer notice.102 The
CPNI rule, however, departs from the majority of state notification provisions by automatically delaying notification by a set period of seven business days after notification to law enforcement, a process which itself is
allotted up to seven additional business days. 10 3 This delay must occur
unless a carrier perceives "an extraordinarily urgent need" to notify condecided to notify all remaining individuals whose information was affected by the breach. See
id. at 699-700.

1798.82(d) (West 2008).
(West 2007).
§ 44-7501(H) (West 2008) (providing for enforcement only by the state attorney general, who may bring an action for actual damages plus a
civil penalty of ten thousand dollars per breach), with WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 19.255.010(10)(a) (West 2007) (allowing any customer injured by a violation of the breach
notification law to bring a civil action to recover damages).
99 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(1).
100 See, e.g., CAL.Crv. CODE § 1798.82(a).
101 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 530/10(a) (West 2007). A few states additionally mandate that such notice be provided no later than 45 days after discovery of the breach.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(a) (West 2007). Wisconsin, however, requires only
that an entity notify individuals whose information was affected by a breach within 45 business days after discovery of the breach. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.507(3)(a) (West 2007).
102 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(c)(1) (West 2007).
103 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2011(b), (b)(1) (2008).
96 CAL. CIV. CODE §

97 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(d)
98 E.g., compare Amz. REv. STAT.
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sumers "in order to avoid immediate and irreparable harm." 1o4 In that
case, the carrier may notify consumers only after consultation with the
05
relevant investigating agency.
This system tends to unnecessarily withhold information from affected individuals, who remain unaware of the breach and thus unable to
take necessary measures to ensure the safety of themselves and other
parties. Although some delay should logically be allowed in order to
enable a carrier to determine the scope of a breach, to prevent further
unauthorized disclosures, and to report the breach to law enforcement,
notifying the consumer as soon as possible after the completion of these
actions allows the consumer to mitigate the damage of identity theft or
other possible harm.' 0 6 As such, a carrier should at the very least be
allowed to notify affected individuals in an expedient manner unless law
enforcement specifically requests a delay.107
The methods of notification included in the majority of state data
breach notification laws would be preferable to the current CPNI policy
because they set baseline standards for the form and content of the notification process to ensure that individuals receive adequate notice of
breaches. Most states have modeled their notification form requirements
after California' s,108 which allows for written notice, electronic notice, or
various forms of "substitute notice" for occasions when the former methods would be impracticable due to high cost, large quantities of affected
individuals, or insufficient contact information.10 9 Some states also per-

mit telephonic notice. 110 A few states, including North Carolina, have
set minimum requirements for the content of the notice.'
The FCC's
CPNI rule declines to adopt any of these standards; instead, it grants
leeway to the carriers to tailor their notification methods according to
their own preferences and capacities, or to meet the exigencies of a par104 Id. § 64.2011(b)(2).
105 Id.
106

See

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROTEC-

TION, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL INFORMATION 11 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubslaws/priv/

Documents/PrivacyProtection.pdf.
107 See id.
108 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65(e) (West 2007).
109 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(b) (West 2008). "Substitute notice" is usually defined to
require all of the following: (1) e-mail notice, (2) conspicuous posting on the breaching party's
website (if any), and (3) notification to major statewide media. Id.
110 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65(e)(3).
111 See, e.g., id. § 75-65(d) (requiring descriptions of (1)the incident, (2) the type of
personal information that was subject to unauthorized access, (3) the general acts of the business to protect the information from further unauthorized access, (4) a phone number that the
consumer may call for further information and assistance, and (5) advice that directs the consumer to review account statements and credit reports).
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ticular situation.1 l2 While such flexibility might simplify compliance
from a carrier's standpoint, it may also permit methods of notice that do
not effectively reach the intended recipients. 1 3 For example, under this
system, a carrier might opt to notify affected customers merely by posting a notice on the carrier's website. A more mutually advantageous
approach would be to follow most states by (1) establishing baseline notification methods and (2) finding a carrier to be compliant if it notifies
consumers in accordance with the established baseline methods in the
114
event of a breach.
Finally, the exceptions to the standard procedures contained in the
state breach notification laws better accord with consumer interests than
those in the FCC's CPNI rule, because the notification priorities of the
state provisions emphasize the privacy interests of consumers over the
investigative concerns of law enforcement. Most states require expedient
notice to consumers unless law enforcement affirmatively requests a delay. 115 In contrast, the CPNI rule mandates a presumption of delayed
notice unless carriers inform law enforcement officials of an extraordinary risk of harm requiring immediate consumer notice. 1 6 This provision of the CPNI rule is problematic because telephone carriers are not
experts on consumer welfare, making it extremely unlikely that they
could accurately predict and distinguish the individualized risks attending one CPNI breach versus another. The state data breach notification
approach to law enforcement coordination is supported in the CPNI context by FCC Commissioner Copps and multiple consumer interest
groups, because it enables law enforcement to conduct a prioritized investigation if necessary while also preserving expedient notice to the
17
consumers affected by a breach."
B.

Proposed Federal Provisions

In an effort to eliminate the difficulties of compliance with the
patchwork system of state data breach disclosure laws currently in force,
lawmakers in the 110th Congress introduced several pieces of legislation
aimed at simplifying and streamlining a private, personal information
holder's response to a newly discovered security breach." 8 The various
112 See Consumer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,948, 31,948, 31,950
(June 8, 2007) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
113 See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 67, at 952 (discussing consumer perceptions of
"triviality" based on junk-mail-like form and confusing content of past data breach notices).
114 See, e.g., CAL. Cwy. CODE § 1798.82(h).
115 See, e.g., id. §§ 1798.29(c), 1798.82(c) (allowing for delayed notice if a law enforcement agency determines that timely notification would impede a criminal investigation).
116 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 l(b)(2) (2008).
117 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
118 See Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 4175, 110th Cong.
(2007); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Security Act
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bills in large part borrow provisions from state data breach laws. The
proposed notification provisions, even if not ultimately passed into law,
could provide a more effective framework for CPNI breach notification
than the requirements of the current FCC rule.
The proposed federal data breach notification laws rightfully require
notice in a more expeditious and practical fashion than the FCC's CPNI
rule. Like some of the state laws, the proposed bills are more limited
than California's data breach notification law, as they require notice only
upon discovery of unauthorized access to personal information that is
reasonably believed to pose a threat to consumers' financial security. 119
Given the centrality of this determination to whether notification occurs,
the more ideal bills mandate law enforcement review of an entity's "risk
assessment."' l20 The bills also uniformly endorse the expediency requirements for consumer notification found in the state laws, eschewing the
automatic delay of the CPNI rule. 12 1 Where law enforcement officials
deem a delay in notice necessary to ensure the efficacy of a criminal
investigation, they may obtain a limited delay upon written request to the
entity. 122 This insistence on timely notice to the extent practicable is
fundamental to ensuring that consumers at risk of identity theft have the
opportunity to monitor their credit reports and remain vigilant for fraud,
while consumers subject to a CPNI breach can take customized preventative action based on the content of the information disclosed. Additionally, the bills follow North Carolina's example in setting forth standards
of 2007, S. 1260, 110th Cong. (2007); Personal Data Protection Act of 2007, S. 1202, 110th
Cong. (2007); Identity Theft Prevention Act, S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); Notification of Risk to Personal
Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong. (2007).
119 See, e.g., S.1202 § 2(2)(B). The Consumers Union has voiced its concern regarding
the subjective assessment of risk that such notice-triggers require. See Letter from Gall Hillebrand, Financial Services Campaign Leader, Consumers Union, to Hon. Mark Pryor, Chair of
Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety, U.S. Senate (Apr. 24, 2007) (on file with Consumers Union), availableat http://www.consumersunion.
org/pdf/SI 178.pdf ("We are deeply concerned that tying notice to an affirmative determination
of risk will excuse notice in that most common of circumstances where there is simply not
enough information to determine the level or nature of the risk due to incomplete
information.").
120 E.g., S.239 § 3(b)(1) (providing safe harbor from the notice requirements if an entity's risk assessment concludes there is no significant risk of harm to individuals, the entity
notifies the United States Secret Service of its conclusion, and the Secret Service does not
indicate that notice should be given).
121 See, e.g., S.495 §§ 311(c)(1)-(2) (requiring notice "without unreasonable delay following the discovery . . . of a security breach" where "reasonable delay" may include "any
time necessary to determine the scope of the security breach, prevent further disclosures, and
restore the reasonable integrity of the data system and provide notice to law enforcement when
required").
122 See S.239 § 2(d)(l). Other bills expand this law enforcement delay for purposes of
civil investigations and national security. See, e.g., S.1178 § 3(e)(2).
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for both the form and content of the notice to be provided. 123 Such basic
standards should be integrated into the CPNI rule-which in its current
state "leaves carriers the discretion to tailor the language and method of
notification to the circumstances" 124-to better ensure that consumers
actually receive notice by a means that captures their attention, imparts
the significance of the breach, and includes resources for assistance or
additional information.
Enforcement obligations in the proposed data breach notification
bills vary but fall primarily to the federal and state attorneys general.
This scheme allows for a greater level of oversight than the CPNI rule's
reliance on the FCC for enforcement. 125 Like the data security bills,
some of the proposed federal CPNI laws attempt to broaden enforcement
of CPNI regulation beyond the FCC by extending enforcement authority
to the states, while leaving breach notification requirements enforceable
only by the FCC. 126 Enabling state enforcement of the CPNI breach notification rule would likely improve carriers' compliance with the provisions by subjecting them to more stringent means of oversight than
accountability to the FCC alone. An even more advantageous approach
might entail delegating responsibility to a third party supervisory agent to
work directly with private information holders in coordinating their responses to newly discovered breaches and in monitoring the effective127
ness of consumer notification.
Like the existing state laws, the proposed federal data breach notification laws represent a superior model for ensuring effective consumer
notice of CPNI breaches because of their insistence on timely, effective,
and practical notice. While the FCC's CPNI rule presumes the necessity
of prioritized notice to law enforcement, other proposed federal laws reverse the presumption in favor of consumers by requiring an affirmative
determination of risk by law enforcement before an agency may delay
consumer notification. 128 The federal data breach notification bills better
balance the interests of consumers with the needs of law enforcement by
allowing limited notification delays only when the relevant officials
deem such delays to be necessary.1 29 The inherent distinctions between
personal information and CPNI should not militate against adopting sim123 See, e.g., S. 1260 §§ 4(c)-(d).
124 Customer Proprietary Network Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,948, 31,950 (June 8,
2007) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
125 See, e.g., S. 239 §§ 8-9. But see S. 1260 § 5 (providing for enforcement by various
administrative entities).
126 See, e.g., Protecting Consumer Phone Records Act, S. 780, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007).
127 See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 67, at 960.
128 See Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong. §§ 2(a),
2(d) (2007); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong. §§ 311-12
(2007).
129 See supra note 122.
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ilar procedures for notifying affected consumers of system breaches of
130
either kind of information.
CONCLUSION

Telephone records are at the heart of the broader societal debate
about consumer privacy in today's information age. 13 1 At a time when
private businesses record and keep a significant portion of personal activities in electronic databases, regulation of the maintenance and dissemination of sensitive consumer information is an essential step in the right
direction, but it alone is not enough to safeguard consumer privacy. 13 2
As many individual states have found, disclosing news of a database
breach of personal information to affected consumers by the most expedient means available best allows consumers to take protective action,
thus mitigating the risk and expense of identity theft and financial
fraud. 133 In the case of telephone records, prompt and meaningful notification of unauthorized disclosure should be even more fundamental because of the unique threat to a person's physical safety posed by the
person who obtained the sensitive information. 3 4 Furthermore, immediate consumer notification in the CPNI context enables affected consumers to assist in the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the
breach, thus making it more likely that the perpetrator will be discovered. 135 Given the sensitivity of CPNI currently vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure, Congress would better protect consumer welfare by
strengthening the FCC's recently adopted CPNI breach notification
standards.

130 See Protecting Consumer Phone Records Act, S. 780, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007) (proposing that the FCC adopt CPNI regulations "similar in scope and structure" to the FTC's
regulations implementing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's protection of financial information,
"taking into consideration the differences between financial information and customer proprietary network information").
131 See Jerry Berman, Security, Privacy, and Government Access to Commercial Data, in
PROTECTING WHAT MATTERS: TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY, AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11, at 100, 103
(Clayton Northouse ed., 2006).
132 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy Self-Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, in
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' 379, 393 (Jane K. Winn

ed., 2006).
133 See Federal Trade Commission, supra note 93.
134 See supra note 71.
135 See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications

Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information,
22 F.C.C.R. 6927, 7020 (Apr. 2, 2007) (further notice of proposed rulemaking).

